Anthropic announced a change to the Messages API: in multi-turn conversations, Claude's context prior to thinking blocks can no longer be edited. The stated goal is to make distillation attacks, which extract chain-of-thought output to train competing models, more difficult. Developers relying on pre-thinking context manipulation in multi-turn flows will need to adjust their integrations.
Codex has started encrypting prompts sent to sub-agents, enhancing security in multi-agent workflows. This change, noted on GitHub, addresses concerns about prompt leakage in agentic systems.
Codex has started encrypting prompts sent to sub-agents, enhancing security in multi-agent workflows. This change, noted on GitHub, addresses concerns about prompt leakage in agentic systems.
Anthropic published a technical explanation of how LLMs like Claude perceive conversation as a single continuous text stream, making it difficult to distinguish between their own generated text and user input. The post uses a snapshot of Claude's response to illustrate the problem, highlighting the fundamental difference between the structured chat interface users see and the raw token sequence the model processes.
Anthropic published a technical explanation of how LLMs like Claude perceive conversation as a single continuous text stream, making it difficult to distinguish between their own generated text and user input. The post uses a snapshot of Claude's response to illustrate the problem, highlighting the fundamental difference between the structured chat interface users see and the raw token sequence the model processes.
Anthropic's Claude Code 2.1.224 introduces inter-agent messaging, enabling text to move between agents by design. Commenters warn this creates a transport layer for AI worms, as prompt injection remains unsolved and injected agents can pass instructions to subsequent agents.
Anthropic's Claude Code 2.1.224 introduces inter-agent messaging, enabling text to move between agents by design. Commenters warn this creates a transport layer for AI worms, as prompt injection remains unsolved and injected agents can pass instructions to subsequent agents.
Following the release of Claude Opus 5, Anthropic quietly removed the visible chain-of-thought reasoning from Claude's web, desktop, and mobile apps, showing 'Thought process is unavailable' instead. Updated documentation indicates newer models may still reason internally but raw chain-of-thought is no longer returned, and even summarized reasoning may be omitted by default.
Following the release of Claude Opus 5, Anthropic quietly removed the visible chain-of-thought reasoning from Claude's web, desktop, and mobile apps, showing 'Thought process is unavailable' instead. Updated documentation indicates newer models may still reason internally but raw chain-of-thought is no longer returned, and even summarized reasoning may be omitted by default.
A new arXiv paper proposes a white-box attack on large language models that exploits locate-then-edit knowledge editing methods. The attack leverages the tendency of edited models to assign high prediction probabilities to edit targets, incorporating associative knowledge retrieval to induce unsafe behavior. This highlights a security vulnerability in models with increasing autonomy.
A new arXiv paper proposes a white-box attack on large language models that exploits locate-then-edit knowledge editing methods. The attack leverages the tendency of edited models to assign high prediction probabilities to edit targets, incorporating associative knowledge retrieval to induce unsafe behavior. This highlights a security vulnerability in models with increasing autonomy.